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THE CLASSICAL REVIEW. 251
THE USE OF IN ARISTOTLE'S POETICS.
THE object of this note is not to urge
any original view about the meaning of
•wtpurirtw., but to emphasize and reinforce the
view which was propounded by Vahlen and
accepted by Susemihl, but which has not
yet taken real hold upon English editors of
the Poetics or commentators upon the Greek
dramatists.
It is not too much to say that the
ordinary English view identifies irtpurertia
with the main change of fortune in the action
of a drama, or, at the best, distinguishes
but slightly between the two. Thus,
Winstanley translates it ' Ingens rerum
conversio, quae vulgo catastrophe ' 5 Cope
(note on Rhet. i. 2) ' a tragic catastrophe ' :
Professor Jebb (Soph. O.T. p. xxvi.) and
Professor Butcher (p. 37) ' a reversal of
fortune'; Professor Campbell (Greek
Tragedy, p. 143) ' a turn of fortune';
Twining ' A Revolution'; Mr. Prickard
' Evolution' (perhaps by misprint for
' Revolution'); Egger ' une revolution des
evenements'; Ueberweg ' Schicksal-wen-
dung.' At the same time some of these
commentators attempt to distinguish it
from the /«Ta/3acris. Thus Twining defines
it, 'a sudden and unexpected reverse of
fortune' or again ' a sudden change to the
reverse of what is expected by tlie spectator
from the circumstances of the action ' : and
Pye, with whom Professor Butcher (p. 307)
almost verbally agrees, 'a sudden and, violent
revolution of fortune brought about by means
apparently likely to produce a contrary effect.'
It is something to have a distinction drawn
and these distinctions are partly in the
right direction, and yet they are far from
exact; for the word carries no necessary
implication of suddenness or violence, it
has no reference to the expectation of the
spectators, and it needs to be sharply dis-
tinguished from the reversal of fortune.
The view propounded by Vahlen is to be
found in his Beitrdge ii. p. 6 and p. 68. I t
is that irepiireVeia is simply any event in
which any agent's intention is overruled to
produce an effect which is the direct oppo-
site of that intention. It belongs to the
class of actions half-voluntary, half-involun-
tary, discussed in the Ethics (III. i.), in
which the action is deliberate, but the result
is not intended, but is produced contrary to
the agent's intention, owing to his ignorance
of the exact circumstances of the case.
£v TOUTOIS ?A.cos Kai <Tvyyvu>/j.rj' 6 yap TOVTWV TI
ayvowv aKovcriw; TrpaTTti. The act may be
that of the hero of the drama, or of any
subsidiary character : it may or may not
produce a change of fortune; it may,
with equal probability, produce a change
to happiness or unhappiness; it may take
place suddenly or gradually: but the
change of fortune is not connotated by the
word and is always a subsequent result
which can be separated in thought and
generally in time from it. It is not so
much ' a specific kind of change of fortune'
(cf. Butcher, p. 307) as one means by which
a change of fortune is brought about.
Three considerations may be urged in
support of this view :—•
(a) In the Poetics 1452a 16—14526 14,
it is classed with dvayycopicris and miflos as
one of the three means which bring about
the change of fortune. It can no more be
identified with the change than either of
the other two means may. Even with
Twining's attempt to give it a separate
connotation, it is illogical to say that a
change of fortune is brought out by a
sudden and unexpected change of fortune.
What Aristotle really says is that some-
times a change of fortune results through a
man's own actions, these being overruled by
circumstances to produce a result quite
different from what he intended. This is
quite clear in the first instance which he
quotes from Soph. O.T. 1002 sqq. The
messenger comes with the intention of
giving joy (<us tv<f>pava>v), but the result is
that he gives unhappiness; his intention
is overruled and his act produces anxiety
and perplexity in the mind of Oedipus and
ultimately leads to the change of his
fortunes, but it is quite different from that
change, which occurs later in the play after
other clues have been followed out. It was
probably equally clear in the story of
Danaus, also quoted by Aristotle. Appa-
rently the action of Danaus himself in
arresting Lynceus led to the deliverance of
Lynceus and his own doom. Another
instance of the use of the word is to be
found in a late writer who seems to
have been influenced by Aristotle's literary
criticism, the Venetian Scholiast on Homer :
in II. ii. 155 sqq. Agamemnon is anxious to
stir the Greeks to make an attack upon Troy;
he tests their courage by proposing that they
should give up the war and sail home; they
take him at his word and prepare for flight
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and are only stopped by the action of
Odysseus under the influence of Hera.
Now in this case no reversal of fortune
occurs; all that happens is that a diplo-
matic move on the part of Agamemnon is
almost overruled to produce the exact
opposite of his intention, and the Venetian
Scholiast applies to this the word irepnrir<ux :
his comment on Homer's treatment of the
scene being, eis TOCTOUTOV irpoayti ras irept-
ircTfias <us /i,rj Svva<r6ai auras aXXov £t /J.T) /HOVOV
HfraOeivai TO Oiiov (quoted in Vahlen's
criticus apparatus on 14545 2). A few
more instances will make the matter
clearer. In the Merchant of Venice,
Shylock insists on the exact letter of his
bond that he may cause the death of
Antonio, but the result of that insistance
is the forfeiture of his own life: that is a
irtpiireTtia. In the story of Adrastus, as
related by Herodotus and followed by W.
Morris in 'The Son of Croesus,' Croesus sends
Adrastus to take charge of his son and
keep him from all danger, but it is the hand
of Adrastus that throws the dart which
kills his son : that is a irepiireTeia, and in
this case the reversal of fortune is iden-
tical in time with it. In the book of
Esther Haman goes to the king's paJace
to speak unto the king to hang Mordecai ;
but the result is that he goes away arraying
Mordecai and causing him to ride through
the street of the city and proclaiming
' Thus shall it be done unto the man whom
the king delighteth to honour.' This is a
irepnreTua, but the reversal of his fortune
follows at some time afterwards and is only
indirectly due to this. Again, in the book
of Genesis, Joseph's brothers sell Joseph
that they may be quit of him and his
dreams; but the result is that the dreams
are fulfilled and he saves their lives—' God
sent me before you to preserve you a
remnant in the earth and to save you alive
by a great deliverance : so now it was not
you that sent me here but God ' ; but the
change in Joseph's fortunes had already
taken place : ' he hath made me a father to
Pharaoh and lord of all his house and ruler
over all the land of Egypt.' Lastly it will
be sufficient to hint at the greatest of all
irtpnrereiai in the world's history, when the
crucifixion which was intended to destroy
the impostor of Nazareth and save the
Jewish race resulted in the lifting up of
the Son of Man and the ruin of Judaism
(cf. esp. S. John xi. 47—53, Acts iv. 10,
25—28).
(b) This view is confirmed by the fact that
Aristotle apparently contemplates that there
may be more than one n-epwrcVeta in the same
play, cf. 1452a 32 KaWio-rr) Se avayvwpurK,
orav a/ta irtpnreTeuu yivatVTai, owv ty^u fj iv
T(S OiSiiroSi. This may, perhaps, press the
use of the plural unduly, but, as a matter
of fact, there are two in the Oedipus
Tyrannus. The first is- to be found in 709
sqq. where Jocasta quotes the failure of the
previous oracle given to Laius in order to
make Oedipus distrust the oracle given to
himself; but the result is that both oracles
are thereby proved to be true. The second
is the case quoted by Aristotle and already
discussed. In one case Jocasta's intention
is overruled, in the other that of the
Corinthian messenger; but the reversal of
fortune is a reversal primarily of the
fortunes of neither of these two, but of
Oedipus,1 and is subsequent in time to each
p
(c) It is extremely interesting to note
the bearing of this interpretation on the
main conception of Greek Tragedy. Mr.
Abbott (Hellenica, p. 62) rightly repudiates
the statement that the tragedy of the
Greeks is no more than a tragedy of
destiny, and adds that Aristotle has no
allusion to destiny in his Poetics. This is not
exactly true; certainly the Greek tragedy
is not primarily fatalistic, it leaves room
for the hero's free will. Yet here in irepi-
•jreTEia, i.e. in one of the three events which
lead to a change of fortunes, we are in the
presence of something above the man's
free will, something akin to destiny. Such
jrepnreraai are classed by Aristotle among
Oavfiaa-rd (R/iet. i. ii.); they do show man
that he is not always master of his fate,
that he is in the presence of powers which
may entirely overrule his intention, not
merely thwarting it but converting it into
the very opposite. In a word 7repiireTeia is
to actions what irony is to language. In
the latter case, words are caught up by
circumstances and charged with a fuller
meaning than the speaker meant; in the
former, deeds are equally caught up out of
his grasp and charged with a meaning the
very opposite of that which the agent
meant. These words from the treatise
falsely attributed to Plutarch, -n-epl TOV /3IOV
teal TIJS 7ro«;crea>s O/xypov ii. c. 120, will
exactly illustrate the point : -^yelrai fiivroi
/cat avros, Sxrirtp KOLI /JLCT' avrov ol SoKifidiraroi
T W <fnXocro<l><oy, HXdruiv KOX AptoTOTtA^s KOI
®£O<£pa<rros, ov Trdvra KOIO' elinapfjLtvrjv Trapa-
yivarOai, dWd TI K<U ori Tot's dvOpwiroi'; eivai,
1
 Cf. Soph. Konig Oedipus ed. G. Kern. Gotha
1884. ' 716 Peripetie—Erste Punkt ; 1021, Peri-
petie—Zweiter Punkt.'
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<av virdp^av p.iv TO inoxHjiov, TOWTO) Se trios
(rvvairrtiv TO KaTrjva.yKa.a'lJ.ti'ov, orav TIS 7rpa^as
o fiovkerai eh o /XT) /JouAeTai ejmreoTj.
There is one passage in the Poetics where
this technical use of TrepnrtTiia, is probably
not used. In 14546 29 the recognition of
Odysseus by his nurse (Od. xix. 396 sqq.) is
described as «K •n-tpurcTcias in opposition to
Trio-Tews iviKa. Professor Butcher translates
it here ' that which results from a turn of
fortune'; but this can scarcely be right.
The recognition does not result from any
turn of fortune : that turn in the fortunes
of Odysseus has not taken place, Odysseus
being still a beggar. Possibly, Vahlen's in-
terpretation is admissible here, though
neither he nor Susemihl apply it to this pas-
sage; the reference might be to Od. xix.
389-391, where Odysseus deliberately tries
to hide the scar but his intention is frus-
trated by the nurse. It would thus mean,
' in spite of the person's own efforts,' and
this makes an excellent antithesis to
TTiortoDs cvcKa. Yet perhaps the simpler ex-
planation is that the word is here used in a
loose popular sense as equivalent to ' an acci-
dent.' This usage is common by the time of
Polybius, with whom Trtpiireriia means little ,
more than ' an accident' or ' a disaster,' and [
£K 7r£piir£T€ias ='accidentally.' Such a degra-
dation of meaning would be very natural;
as the conception of Et/uap^ eVij gives way
before that of Tu^ in Euripides and in
Menander, it is natural that Trcpin-cTeia
si'.ould sink from an event in which destiny
and the Gods overrule a man's free will for
ends not his own into the mere conception
of capricious accident.
WALTER LOCK.
KebU College, Oxford.
NOTES ON SOME PASSAGES (PP. 55-64) IN LIGHTFOOT'S BIB Lid AL ESSAYS.
IT is a somewhat ungracious task to
criticize Lightfoot's Essays on St. John's
Gospel in the face of the editor's own
statement (p. vii.) that ' they would pro-
bably never have been published by Dr.
Lightfoot himself,' and that, owing to the
peculiar difficulties presented by the MS.
(p. viii.), ' i t is inevitable...that in places the
Bishop's meaning will have been obscurely
expressed, if not entirely missed.' But, so
far as I have seen, critics have not recoguized
the full force of these confessions. They
have placed on the same level the Johanuine
and the Pauline portions of the Biblical
Essays. By such a want of discrimination
the cause of truth suffers for the moment,
and the authority of our most scholarly
theologian may suffer hereafter. I propose
therefore to call attention to some errors in
the second of these Essays for the purpose of
confirming the editorial statement that
' they would probably never have been
published by Dr. Lightfoot himself.'
In setting forth the proofs of the
apostolic origin of the Fourth Gospel,
Lightfoot lays stress on the evidence of
Irenaeus as being (B. E. p. 55) ' a pupil of
St. John's personal disciple Polycarp,' whose
teaching Irenaeus describes in the well-
known letter to Florinus (Eus. U. E. v. 20);
and, after quoting this letter, he adds (B. E.
p. 55) ' It will suffice to notice (1) the
opportunities of the witness, (2) the
thoroughness of the evidence (jravra O-V/J.-
<p<ava Tais ypa.fpa.2s). I n more t h a n one
passage also of his great work he refers to
the " Church of Ephesus," or to the elders
who associated with John in Asia.'
But before laying stress on ' the oppor-
tunities of the witness,' and ' the thorough-
ness of the evidence,' is it not natural to
ask, concerning the witness himself, whether
he is to be trusted as to his own ' opportuni-
ties "I Is he so free from bias and
exaggeration that we can feel satisfied as to
his warrant for Polycarp's complete con-
formity to ' the Scriptures,' and for
Polycarp's descriptions of ' his intercourse
with John and with the rest of those who
had seen the Lord ' t
There are great differences of opinion as
to Irenaeus' age when he heard Polycarp:
but the tenor of his account justifies the
conclusion that he was a mere boy, more
impressed by Polycarp's personal appearance,
gestures, and circumstances of teaching,
than by the teaching itself.1 It would seem
1
 He accounts for his vivid recollection of
Polycarp's teaching by saying that (Eus. H. E. v.
20) al 4K waitiuv /ua0jj<reis grow with the soul and
become identified with it. This adverbial phrase
indicates the early days of boyJwod, say about twelve :
and it seems safer to suppose that Irenaeus is here
using the words in their ordinary sense than that he
is referring to his own very arbitrary classification
into five ages(Ir. ii. 22, 4 ; ii. 24, 4), where he deserts
the old classification of seven ages (adopted by Philo
